Should the US Grand Strategy continue its commitment to European security, or should it be focused elsewhere? Foreign policy and national security experts have debated that question since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Foreign policy thinkers like Christopher Layne, John Mearsheimer, and Stephen Walt recently proposed a new US Grand Strategy based on Offshore balancing. Offshore balancing is a realist approach by which a great power retains its security and superpower position by using allied regional powers to balance against a potential competitor.1 In essence, this means that a global power has the capability to defend itself and extend its influence to support a coalition of regional powers against another global power. Scholars like Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the US is uniquely positioned to adopt offshore balancing as its national security strategy. They propose that the US should concentrate on maintaining its dominance in the Western Hemisphere while encouraging other nations to take the lead in containing emerging powers, intervening only when necessary.2 National security scholars point to 19th-century Great Britain as a model for what offshore balancing would look like.
This blog will highlight an 1815 Map of Europe to examine Great Britain’s grand offshore balancing strategy during the 19th century and will discuss:
- the international relations theories of Realism and its sub-theory of balance of power, explaining what each is and means;
- the Congress of Vienna and establishing the European balance of power;
- how the European balance of power from the Congress of Vienna settlement allowed Great Britain to implement its offshore balancing strategy; and
- if offshore balancing is possible in the 21st century.
The Theory of Realism and Balance of Power
Before discussing the Congress of Vienna, it’s essential to understand the theoretical framework by which International Relations scholars (and this blog) analyze it: Realism. Realism is the most dominant and oldest of the international relations theories. Realism says a country’s foreign policy should prioritize its national interests. Realists focus on competition between states and are generally uninterested in a state’s internal affairs.3
The basis of Realism is four assumptions about the international system:
- The international system is anarchic. In other words, no supreme power exists to resolve issues between nation-states.
- The nation-state is the principal actor in the international system.
- The nation-state is a singular, unitary actor.
- The decision-makers within the nation-states are rational actors who make decisions based on national interests.4
In essence, Realism is about self-preservation through the competition for power. Realism views international politics as a competition between nations, where each vies for power without any referee to regulate any nation’s actions. For those who want to read more about Realism, read articles and books by scholars Hans Morgenthau, John Mearsheimer, and Kenneth Waltz.
Within the theory of Realism is a concept called “balance of power.” The balance of power theory says peace is the outcome of preventing one state, faction, or figure from gaining enough power to dominate the others. If one state becomes too powerful, it will seek to take over its weaker neighbors, which leads its neighbors to unite in a defensive coalition. States can balance against each other through their internal policies by increasing their economic capabilities and military strength or developing clever strategies. States can also balance against each other externally by forming allies.5 To read more about the balance of power theory, read Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics.
The Congress of Vienna
The Congress of Vienna was an 1815 conference created by and for the four allied powers of Russia, Austria, Great Britain, and Prussia to decide what Europe would look like in a post-Napoleonic War Europe. As the Napoleonic Wars ended, the four allied powers saw the need for a conference to (1) keep France from determining the fate of territories outside its borders, (2) improve their position through territory, and (3) determine the fate of lesser European powers.6 Additionally, the powers were concerned with two issues. The first issue was the ideas associated with the French Revolution. The second (and most important) issue was to prevent France (or any other European state) from starting a war as devastating as the Napoleonic Wars.7 The system the powers agreed was the best to stop another devastating war was the balance of power idea. The basis of the concept was that peace would be preserved if each of the five great powers (Russia, Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and France) was militarily strong enough to defend against an attack of another power. The idea originated with British representative Viscount Castlereagh and Austrian representative Clemons von Metternich.8 From the negotiations before, during, and after the Congress of Vienna, Europe emerged with a balance of power system that resulted in relative peace until the outbreak of World War I.9
Congress of Vienna Settlements and European Balance of Power
The Congress of Vienna also established a territorial settlement agreement that created a balance of power system in Europe. This system was based on three zones: the West, Center, and East. Each zone consisted of territory that met the strategic needs of the powers, did not provoke jealousy from other powers, and did not antagonize France.10 The western zone consisted of numerous buffer states that aimed to prevent France from expanding beyond its borders. The center zone consisted of a power vacuum with a patchwork of German states ensuring Germany remained weak. In addition, the southern center zone also had a power vacuum of small states in which Austria could dominate within its sphere of influence. The most contentious part of the Congress of Vienna occurred during the Eastern Zone settlement negotiations. The settlement granted Russia most of Poland and Prussia half of Saxony.11
The territorial settlements of Austria, Prussia, and Russia mimicked each other because they divided the former European territories beyond France’s traditional borders amongst each of the mainland European great powers. All the great powers received territories except for Great Britain. Britain refused territory in continental Europe. The refusal of mainland European territory was by design. Britain wanted to remain free of European commitments and avoid being drawn into future continental wars or alliances. By not being drawn into any alliances, Britain was free to act or not act during any future European wars.12 Although Great Britain did not receive any territory on the European mainland, it did receive a favorable settlement from the Congress of Vienna. Britain negotiated for and ensured that an independent Belgian nation was established. Great Britain received territory in the form of colonies. The colonies were essential to Britain because they gave Britain a supplier of raw materials, a market for its goods, and naval bases for its ships protecting sea lanes. Additionally, Britain negotiated a favorable settlement about the rights to seas and rivers, including opening the Baltic Sea (formally controlled by Denmark) for access to the ports of Danzig and Riga.13
British Offshore Balancing
The Congress of Vienna settlement established a balance of power between the four great powers of mainland Europe. This balance created political conditions that allowed Great Britain, which had no territory on the European mainland, to implement its offshore balancing grand strategy. This strategy, coined “Splendid Isolation” by British statesman Lord Salisbury, was based on three main things: (1) geographical location, (2) control of the maritime domain, and (3) no near peer challenger.14
Geographical Location
As an island nation, Britain is separated from mainland Europe by the English Channel to the south (at its closest point, 21 miles separate Britain and mainland Europe), and the North Sea separates Britain from Norway to the east.15 Britain’s geographical separation from mainland Europe gave it a natural distance that no European power had experienced. The English Channel and North Sea act as natural protectors, making it difficult for land forces to invade the British Isle. Britain’s natural strategic Depth gives its homeland a defense few countries enjoy.
Strategic Depth refers to the distance between a state’s potential or actual enemies and its economic, political, and demographic heartland.16 This distance allows a defending state army more time to create defensive positions and opportunities to engage the invading state army at the time and place of the defending army’s choosing. It also causes the invading state army to travel longer distances, thus stretching logistical supply lines, which allows the defending state army to disrupt.17
Britain’s natural Strategic Depth from mainland Europe and its Navy gave the British Isles a well-defended homeland from potential invasions. The water is a natural protector, making it difficult for invading armies to traverse. The British Navy adds protection by engaging any possible land invasion force during transport to Britain’s borders. Additionally, strategic Depth allows Great Britain to establish defensive positions if its Navy cannot stop the landing force during transport.
Therefore, Britain’s Strategic Depth from mainland Europe (and not having any land from the Congress of Vienna settlement) separated it from the other four powers, allowing it to implement offshore balancing. Britain could observe what was happening on mainland Europe while keeping its distance and not getting involved unless one of the four powers had hegemonic desires. With an invasion unlikely, Britain could concentrate on its economic well-being and empire while sitting on the sidelines of Europe as a passive observer who participates when participation is advantageous for Britain.
Unrivaled Naval Superiority
During the 19th century, British interests revolved around protecting the homeland from invasion and imperial assets and projecting power beyond the English littoral waters. To accomplish this, the British government invested in its Navy. These investments enhanced Britain’s Naval capabilities, allowing it to enjoy unrivaled superiority amongst the other great European powers.18
One investment the British made to maintain a superior navy was its ship construction process. British warships were the strongest and had the longest service time due to construction improvements in traditional wooden ships. Older ships, especially ships of the line and frigates, were reinforced and strengthened with better-seasoned timber. The British built ships slowly in enclosed facilities protected from the weather, placing them on an improved overhaul schedule. With studier ships, the British could outfit the boat with larger guns, such as shell-firing guns, which offered greater explosive power per shot.19
Another investment the British made to maintain a superior navy was in the number of ships and sailors. In 1840, the British Navy had a battleship force of 77 ships, a difference of 54 battleships compared to France (23) and 44 battleships compared to Russia (33). By 1841, the British had 73 ships of the line afloat, 14 under construction, and five on order.20 The number of British ships increased because the British Parliament invested in expanding the number of sailors. In 1832, Parliament invested in 27,000 sailors and increased their investment to 43,000 in 1841.21
Arguably, the most important investment was in a new type of naval propulsion: steam. The British Navy pioneered steam propulsion, with eleven steam warships in service by 1835 and fifty-three in service by 1845.22 Steamships were vital in littoral operations. They could tow ships to their optimal position on the line, move inside the range of fixed guns designed to defend the coast against a ship with sails and carry out an offensive operation rather than a defensive operation waiting for a nation to attack.23
The investments in the British Navy allowed Britain to project power beyond the English Channel during the Crimean War in the Baltic Sea theatre. Sir Charles Napier, Commander-in-chief for the Baltic theatre, led a force of 18 ships with 1160 guns for a naval blockade around the Baltic Sea. This blockade kept five-eighths of the Russian naval strength and half of the Russian land forces tied up in the Baltic, unable to get to the Crimean theatre. Further, Napier’s naval forces destroyed the Bomarsund fortress and prevented Russia from establishing a naval base in the Aland islands.24
The Royal Navy’s supremacy gave Britain a protective feeling. They knew their Navy could defend the homeland and the empire because of robust ship construction, vast number of ships, and superior naval propulsion. These factors allowed the British Navy to deter any potential invader and serve as a balancer against any mainland European power-seeking hegemony.
Control of the Maritime Domain
The Congress of Vienna settlement left Europe with a balance of power system among the great European powers. However, the balance of power was among the four continental powers of France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. On the sea, no one balanced Great Britain, who reigned supreme.
Britain gained control of the maritime domain (which, per NATO, “encompasses the oceans and seas-including everything on, above, and below the surface, in all direction”s) during the Napoleonic Wars.25 During the Napoleonic Wars, the British Navy defeated Napoleon at the Battle of Trafalgar. This battle thwarted Napoleon’s plans to invade the British Isles. With Napoleon’s defeat, the British Navy controlled the maritime domain.26
The British Empire derived its power and wealth from its colonial possessions in America and the Indian subcontinent, with India being the most important.27 The British relied on their Indian colony for the commodities it provided, such as cotton, silk, porcelain, spices, tea, and coffee. The commodities were then extracted in their raw form in India and shipped to Britain, where the raw commodity was made into a finished product. The finished product was then sent back to India, where it was sold or transited through India to places like China.28 With its colonies being the economic engine for the empire, Great Britain’s unrivaled control of the maritime domain allowed it to protect its colonies, making it difficult for a mainland European power to disrupt Britain’s economy.
In addition to being the economic engine for Great Britain, the strategic positioning of its colonies allowed the British Navy to project power. Many colonies Britain received through the Congress of Vienna settlement were strategically located islands and ports with good harbors. The strategic positions allowed the British Navy to protect the sea lanes, which the raw goods and finished products traversed to and from Great Britain. For example, the colony of Malta helped support the British Mediterranean fleet. With British control of Malta, Gibraltar, the Ionian Islands, and the Suez Canal, the Mediterranean was effectively a British lake.29 Because these colonies could be used as bases, the British could use the seas to facilitate their trade while blockading and denying another access to the sea trade routes.30
Can Offshore Balancing Work in the 21st Century?
Offshore balancing was a good idea for 19th-century Great Britain, but could it work in the 21st century? The answer is no. Implementing offshore balancing is a 19th-century answer to 21st-century problems. The main reason is that the 21st-century world is too integrated economically, politically, and militarily for a nation, especially a superpower, to implement offshore balancing.
Offshore balancing is based on selective restraint. While selective restraint was feasible for 19th-century Great Britain for reasons previously mentioned, the world’s interconnectedness economically, politically, and militarily creates limits that would make it difficult for a 21st-century nation to implement offshore balancing. Economically, nations are too integrated with each other’s economies, including nations with tense diplomatic relationships. Further, supply lines are such that goods manufactured in one nation depend on parts manufactured in another.
Politically, many nations are members of various supranational organizations. One of the keys to Great Britain implementing its offshore balancing strategy was staying out of alliances with mainland European powers. Not aligning with a mainland European power allowed Britain to pick and choose when and how it would become involved in a mainland European conflict. 21st-century nations are in a different situation than Great Britain. The nations are members of the United Nations and can partner with UN missions to keep the peace worldwide. In addition, the UN has five permanent members of the Security Council that can veto any United Nations resolution they object to.
Militarily, 21st-century nations have alliances with countries in North America, South America, Asia, Europe, and Africa. One example of a military alliance is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This alliance allows its member nations to respond to potential and actual conflicts. However, NATO membership does not give its member nations the same freedom Great Britain had to pick and choose its military involvements. If one NATO member is attacked, all NATO members are required to respond.
Conclusion
The Congress of Vienna settlement offered Great Britain an international climate to implement offshore balancing successfully. Britain’s geographical location, insulated economy, and unrivaled navy power that controlled the seas enabled Britain to adopt an isolationist grand strategy that prioritized its national interests and engaged with mainland European affairs only when Britain’s interests were threatened. Although political scientists advocate that this strategy can work today, the modern geopolitical environment makes implementing offshore balancing unfeasible. The integration of the world’s economies and the political and military alliances renders the isolationist principles of offshore balancing impractical. While learning about offshore balancing as a concept is needed, implementing it as a practical grand strategy in the 21st century is not advised nor encouraged.
End Notes
1. Major John Pendergrass, “Contemporary Lessons from British Offshore Balancing Strategy in the Napoleonic Wars,” Wild Blue Yonder Online Journal, Air University, December 7th, 2023. Access September 15, 2024. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Articles/Article-Display/Article/3607766/contemporary-lessons-from-british-offshore-balancing-strategy-in-the-napoleonic/
2. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 4 (2016) pg. 71
3. “The A to Z of international relations,” The Economist, accessed September 5, 2024, https://www.economist.com/international-relations-a-to-z#R.
4. Sandra Antunes and Isabel Camisao “Introducing Realism in International Theory” in International Relations Theory, ed. Stephen McGlinchey, Christian Scheinpflug, and Rosie Walters (E-International Relations Publishing, 2017) pg. 15
e-ir.info/publication/international-relations-theory
5. “Los Dialogos Panamericanos: Balance of Power,” George Washington University, accessed September 22nd, 2024, blogs.gwu.edu/ccas-panamericanos/peace-studies-wiki/peace-studies-wiki/approaches-to-peace/balance-of-power/
6. Mark Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna and its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy after Napoleon (London: I.B. Tauris & Company, limited 2013), Pg 69-70 ProQuest Ebook Central
7. Tim Chapman, The Congress of Vienna: Origins, Processes and Results (Taylor & Francis Group, 1998), pg. 1-2 ProQuest Ebook Central
8. Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna and its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy after Napoleon. Pg 85-86
9. Tsira Shvandgiradze, “What was the Concert of Europe?” The Collector May 1, 2023. Thecollector.com/what-was-the-concert-of-europe/. Accessed September 30th, 2024. Chapman, The Congress of Vienna: Origins, Processes and Results pg. 33
10. Chapman, The Congress of Vienna: Origins, Processes and Results pg. 41-42
11. Ibid, 41-42
12. Ibid 20
13. Ibid, 50-52
14. Alexander Gale. “British Grand Strategy and the European Balance of Power: 1815-1914” The Collector June 2, 2024. Accessed September 30th, 2024. https://www.thecollector.com/british-grand-strategy-european-balance-power/
15. “English Channel and Sediments from the Thames Estuary and Rhine-Meuse-Schelt Delta, Northern Europe” Earth Snapshot, archived October 23rd, 2011, at https://web.archive.org/web/20200530092024/http://www.eosnap.com/tag/strait-of-dover/
16. “The Importance of Strategic Depth” International Strategic Analysis, October 24th, 2018. https://www.isa-world.com/news/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=442&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=1&cHash=2fab7c50561ded287453afb408a82901
17. Anit Mukherjee, “What is Strategic Depth? What does it mean? If possible, please give some example” Ask an Expert, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Accessed October 2nd, 2024. https://idsa.in/askanexpert/Whatisstrategicdepth
18. Alexander Gale. “British Grand Strategy and the European Balance of Power: 1815-1914” The Collector June 2, 2024. Accessed September 30th, 2024. https://www.thecollector.com/british-grand-strategy-european-balance-power/
19. Rebecca Berens Matzke Deterrence through Strength: British Naval Power and Foreign Policy under Pax Britannica (University of Nebraska Press, 2011) pg 38
20. Ibid, 47
21. Ibid, 47
22. Ibid, 40
23. Ibid, 40-43
24. Anniki Mikelsaar, The Royal Navy’s Baltic Assignments in the Crimean War (1854-55) and in the Russian Civil War (1918-1920)-Operational and Technical Insights, The Naval Review February 2nd, 2024, Accessed October 15th, 2024 https://www.naval-review.com/news-views/the-royal-navys-baltic-assignments-in-the-crimean-war-1854-55-and-in-the-russian-civil-war-1918-1920-operational-and-technological-insights/
25. “NATO’s maritime activities” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, August 3, 2023, Accessed October 10th, 2024 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_70759.htm#:~:text=The%20maritime%20domain%20encompasses%20oceans,and%20management%2C%20and%20cooperative%20security.
26. “The Battle of Trafalgar: a timeline” Royal Museums Greenwich: National Maritime Museum, Accessed October 11th, 2024 https://www.rmg.co.uk/stories/topics/battle-of-trafalgar?_gl=1%2A1c3uud1%2A_up%2AMQ..%2A_ga%2ANzY2NTg3NzQ0LjE3MjkxMDA0ODQ.%2A_ga_7JJ3J5DBF6%2AMTcyOTEwMDQ4My4xLjAuMTcyOTEwMDQ4My4wLjAuMA..%2A_ga_4MH5VEZTEK%2AMTcyOTEwMDQ4My4xLjAuMTcyOTEwMDQ4My4wLjAuMA
27. Alexander Gale. “British Grand Strategy and the European Balance of Power: 1815-1914” The Collector June 2, 2024. Accessed September 30th, 2024. https://www.thecollector.com/british-grand-strategy-european-balance-power/
28. Isaac Johnson, Erik Lampe, and Keith Wilson “British successes in 19th century Great Power Competition: lessons for today’s joint force” Joint Force Quarterly 108 (2023):91, Accessed October 12th, 2024 https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3264648/british-successes-in-19th-century-great-power-competition-lessons-for-todays-jo/
29. Paul M. Kennedy The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (The Ashfield Press, 1989) pg 154-155
30. Matzke Deterrence through Strength: British Naval Power and Foreign Policy under Pax Britannica pg 50
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Gale, Alexander. “British Grand Strategy and the European Balance of Power: 1815-1914” The Collector June 2, 2024. https://www.thecollector.com/british-grand-strategy-european-balance-power/
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